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Abstract 
Several researchers explored the impact of cognition, language and social understanding on theory of mind abilities in typically 
developing (TD) children and children with intellectual disabilities (ID) (either ID of genetic origin or non-specific ID). The aim 
of the present study was to determine the specificity of the theory of mind deficit to different groups of children with ID. The 
results are in accordance with the developmental approach of similar structure hypothesis (Zigler, 1969). The findings are 
discussed in terms of the specificity of the etiology-related theory of mind profiles of ID groups, considering the educational and 
social inclusion practices. 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Theory of Mind (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions to the 
self and to others – has mainly been explored in relation to typically developing (TD) and autistic individuals 
(Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993; Butterworth, Harris, Leslie, & Wellman, 1991; Happe´, 1995; 
Taylor, 1996). Additionally, several authors explored the impact of cognition, language and social understanding on 
theory of mind abilities in these groups (Abbeduto, Short-Meyerson, Benson, & Dolish, 2004; Rosnay & Hughes, 
2006). However, in ToM research, children with intellectual disabilities (ID) have generally been used as a 
comparison group, and have rarely been studied in their own right. Different studies have used various comparison 
groups with heterogeneous etiologies, ranging from individuals with Down syndrome (DS), to autistic individuals 
with ID, non-specific ID, and learning disabled individuals. All these sub-groups of individuals with ID might 
manifest different developmental trajectories. Thus, the great variability within this population makes the results 
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difficult to interpret. Furthermore, the study of unique profiles of development among specific etiological groups of 
children with ID is essential for all aspects of research and intervention in the field of ID (Cicchetti & Beeghly, 
1990; Dykens, 1998; Hodapp, Burack, & Zigler, 1990). Specifically, other studies have tried to better define 
comparative samples, selecting particular sub-groups of intellectually impaired people, such as individuals with 
genetic syndromes (Abbeduto & Murphy, 2004; Cornish et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2006; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & 
Solomonica-Levi, 1998). Thus, similarities and differences in ToM performance among the various groups are 
discussed relative to the specific linguistic and cognitive profiles of the different groups. Actually, many researches 
(Jervis & Baker, 2003; Thirion-Marissiaux & Nader-Grosbois, 2008) have found developmental patterns, either 
partially different or partially similar on ToM abilities between TD children and children with ID (either ID of 
genetic origin or non-specific ID). These profiles would serve a clinical and educational purpose by aiding in the 
design of intervention programs that address the varying proficiencies and deficiencies unique to particular 
syndrome groups. 
Much of the research about ToM ability relies on false belief (FB) tasks as indicators of whether or not a child 
has mental state understanding (Lewis et al., 2006). There have been hundreds of articles concerning this task, 
comparing the performance of different groups, of the same mental (MA) or chronological age (CA), exploring how 
success correlates with linguistic and general cognitive and social skills, and extending the task in various ways. All 
these ToM research aimed to test the hypothesis of delay versus the “difference” hypothesis about the ToM belief 
development in atypical populations in comparison with TD populations. The similar-structure hypothesis (Zigler, 
1969), which is tested in this study, proposes that people with ID develop in line with their MA, therefore, there 
aren’t any statistical significant differences in their performance when compared to those without ID.  
Therefore, three questions were investigated in the present study: (a) “Do children with ID (non-specific ID and 
DS) differ in their performance in the ToM tasks when compared with TD children matched on their MA?”, (b) “Do 
children with ID (non-specific ID and DS) have similar or different strengths and weaknesses in the ToM tasks?”, 
and (c) “Which verbal and performance abilities, as assessed with the WISC-III, are associated with performance on 
the ToM tasks for each one of the groups ?” To explore these questions, it was necessary to use several ToM tasks, 
such as FB and appearance-reality (AR) tasks to observe different abilities developed to understand other's minds 




The present study involved two clinical groups of participants: 12 children with DS and 20 children with non-
specific ID. The control group consisted of 20 TD children. The sex ratio in these three groups was approximately 
1:1 (M:F). The mean CA in DS group (M=10,27 years, S.D.= 0,48) and the mean CA in non-specific ID group (M= 
9,74 years, S.D.=0,51) were significantly higher than in the TD group (M=6,46 years, S.D.=0,33), F(2,49) = 383,955    
p < 0.001. The groups were matched on overall MA using the WISC-III-GR (Georgas et al., 1997). The mean MA 
did not differ among the ID groups [(DS group: M=6,55 years, S.D.= 0,44), (ID group: M= 6,65 years, S.D.=0,59)] 
and the TD group (M=6,80 years, S.D.=0,43), F(2,49) = 0,996 p = 0.377. The participants were native speakers of 
Greek origin. All children with ID had mild intellectual disability (IQ: 55-70) (Luckasson et al., 2002) and were 
receiving special education and none were living in institutional settings. Furthermore, none of the children in any of 
the groups had sensory impairments including hearing deficits and decreased visual acuity. Finally, none of the 




Two ToM FB tasks were distributed in order to estimate the understanding of the mental state “belief”: the 
location change and the unexpected-content and three ToM AR tasks: colour/size/identity. 
 
 2.2.1. Location change task  
    The procedure for the location change FB task was consistent with that utilized by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). 
Each child was introduced to two doll protagonists, Mary and Anne. Mary placed a marble into a basket and then 
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left the scene. Anne then transferred the marble from the basket to the box and left the scene. At the time Mary 
returned, the experimenter asked the child a series of questions, ‘Where will Mary look for her marble?’, the reality 
question ‘Where is the marble really?’, and the memory question ‘Where was the marble in the beginning?’. A child 
scored one point for the belief question if they pointed to the location at which Mary had originally left the marble. 
Participants were counted as having passed if they answered the memory, reality, and prediction questions correctly. 
 
 2.2.2 Unexpected content task  
Children were asked to predict the content of a familiar container (e.g. smarties). After giving the expected 
answer (all participants did so) the child was then shown that the box contained something different (e.g. crayons). 
The container was then closed and the child was asked a reality control question (Now, what's really in this box?), 
followed by a test ignorance question [When ( friend or sibling's name) sees this box all closed up tight, will he/she 
know what's inside?)] and a test false belief question (What will he/she think is inside?). A child scored one point 
for the belief question. 
 
 2.2.3. The appearance–reality tasks 
The procedure for the AR tasks was consistent with that employed by Baron-Cohen (1989). These tasks consisted 
of the separate manipulation of an object’s colour, size, and identity. After a warm-up procedure, in each trial, an 
appearance and a reality question was asked and once the child had answered both questions, their responses were 
coded into correct, phenomenist, realist or other. So, for example, on the first of two colour trials, a bottle of milk 
was shown to the child, who was asked to name the object and its colour. An orange filter was then placed in front 
of the object and the child was asked the appearance question ‘Now what colour does the milk look?’ and the reality 
question ‘What colour is it really?’ A correct response was that the milk looked orange but was really white, a 
phenomenist response was that the milk looked orange and really was orange, and a realist response was that the 
milk looked white and really was white. A similar procedure was followed for the remaining AR tasks: size, and 
identity (4 trials on each of the three tasks). A correct answer to a pair of AR questions was awarded 1 point.  
3. Procedure 
All participants were tested at school. Total administration time varied from participant to participant, but 
required from 1.30 to 2 h, across two sessions for each participant (during 40–60 min according to the participant's 
attention). WISC-III was administered before the ToM tasks. The session took place in a quiet and familiar room.  
 
 4. Results 
 
Analysis indicated that there were positive and significant Pearson correlations between the ToM tasks and the 
verbal ability subscales of WISC-III only for the clinical groups. Actually, for the ID group, the Information was 
significantly correlated with the performance on the ToM FB tasks (r = 0.46, p = 0.039). For the DS group, the Digit 
Span was significantly correlated with the performance on the ToM FB tasks (r = 0.65, p = 0.021), the Arithmetic 
subscale with the performance on the AR colour tasks (r = 0.63, p = 0.025) and also, the Verbal IQ with the AR 
colour task (r = 0.59, p = 0.041).  
 Further ANOVA indicated that factor ‘group’ significantly influences children’s performance on the ToM FB 
tasks: F(2.49) = 28.686, p < 0.001, and the AR colour tasks: F(2.49) = 6.970, p < 0.005, as well as, the AR identity tasks 
F(2.49) = 15.661, p < 0.001. Post hoc LSD test indicated that there was statistically significant difference in ID vs DS 
groups (p < 0.001) and DS vs TD (p < 0.001) on the ToM FB tasks’ performance. In addition to that, there was 
statistically significant difference in ID vs DS groups (p < 0.001) and DS vs TD groups (p < 0.001) on the AR 
colour and identity tasks’ performance. However, there wasn't statistically significant difference on the performance 
of TD vs ID in the ToM FB and AR colour and identity tasks (p > 0.05). Only on the AR size tasks there was not 
any significant difference among all the groups, as all participants passed successfully the AR size tasks. Table 1. 
presents descriptive statistics for each task between the three groups. 
 
3886  Stergiani Giaouri et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 3883–3887 
 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations in ToM tasks in TD, ID, and DS groups. 
ToM 
tasks Group N Mean SD 
ID 20 1,65 ,59 
DS 12 ,50 ,67 




Total 52 1,48 ,75 
ID 20 4,00 ,00 
DS 12 3,25 1,29 




Total 52 3,83 ,68 
ID 20 4,00 ,00 
DS 12 4,00 ,00 




Total 52 4,00 ,00 
ID 20 2,85 ,67 
DS 12 1,67 ,49 




Total 52 2,64 ,86 
 
Moreover, logistic regression analysis were applied in order to examine the relative contribution of independent 
variables (Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, Full Scale IQ, Verbal and Performance subscales of WISC-III) to ToM 
performance for all the groups. The analysis showed that only for participants with DS, the Arithmetic (WISC-III 
Verbal subscale) was able to predict the performance on the AR tasks (beta = 0.755, t = 4.836, p < 0.005). 
5. Conclusions  
In the present study, ToM abilities were thoroughly examined, employing different FB and AR tasks, comparing 
MA matched non-specific ID, DS, and TD children. The present study was limited by the small sample size, and 
therefore, needs to be replicated on larger independent samples. However, the results clearly showed that children 
with DS performed more poorly than the children with non-specific ID, and TD, and that the TD children did not 
perform significantly better than the children with non-specific ID. These findings are consistent with many 
previous reports (Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998). Our results are, also, in accordance with the 
developmental approach of similar structure hypothesis (Zigler, 1969), at least for TD and non-specific ID children.    
However, the key finding from the present study is the difference between the two ID groups on the ToM 
measures. This cross ID dissociation in ToM abilities underlines the importance of looking beyond global outcomes 
of cognitive and behaviour functioning and the necessity to move towards isolating those subtle differences in 
information processing that point to DS specific developmental trajectories (Nadel, 2006). Therefore, the specific 
characteristics and the etiology of any given comparison group of ID may relate to the results and the interpretation 
of any study. Then, it is possible to say on the basis of the present study that theory of mind deficits can be 
explained by the specific cognitive phenotype of ID (for example DS) rather than their overall ability. On the other 
side, similarities in performance of some ToM abilities (AR tasks) in both clinical groups may be explained by the 
fact that these tasks require: a change in visual perspectives taking, linguistic abilities and, some executive 
functions—including auditory short-term memory, metacognition abilities, inhibitory control and management of 
attention, that are usually deficient in the atypical population in general. 
Examining the correlations of ToM performance in the groups, we found that only for the clinical groups, the FB 
and the AR colour tasks tended to correlate with distinct verbal abilities. Thus, it can generally be argued that ToM 
performance requires a verbal ability which is similar to the cognitive ability measured by the WISC-III verbal 
subscales, such as Information, Digit span and Arithmetic. Indeed, these subscales require verbal processing, verbal 
short and long-term memory skills and problem solving styles, which closely resemble the auditory sequencing ToM 
tasks. 
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The associations between ToM abilities and cognitive skills for both groups carry implications for training. Such 
a finding would have extensive implications for the ways trainers could interact with groups of ID to develop ToM 
understanding and empower them to use this type of thinking in their everyday lives. Future studies could also 
examine ToM abilities and their association with different cognitive and social/emotional abilities. Finally, etiology-
based research is important for more specific, targeted educational interventions. As noted earlier, children with ID 
show etiology-related patterns of cognitive and learning strengths and weaknesses. Capitalizing on the idea that 
educational interventions might ‘play to the child’s strengths’, we borrow those educational techniques that teachers 
have begun to use with children who show simultaneous over sequential processing, or visual over auditory 
processing, or linguistic over visuospatial processing (Hodapp, DesJardin, & Ricci, 2003). Although the value of all 
such strategies and educational support remains unknown at the present time, all seem promising for more effective 
interventions and inclusive conditions for students with ID. 
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